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Value Premium and Investor Sentiment 
 
I. Introduction 
There is substantial evidence suggesting that stocks with high book-to-market equity (BE/ME) 
have higher average returns than stocks with low BE/ME (e.g. Rossenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; 
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991; Capaul, Rowley, and Sharp, 1993; Fama and French, 1998; and 
Davis, Fama, and French, 2000). What explains the value premium is still controversial.    
There are two competing explanations for the value premium. One suggests that value premium is 
a compensation for risk (e.g. Fama and French, 1996; Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 2004; Zhang, 
2005; Cooper, 2006). In particular, Zhang (2005) presents a neoclassical rational expectation model 
showing that costly reversibility causes assets in place to be harder to reduce, and hence are riskier than 
growth options especially in bad times when the price of risk is high. As a result, high BE/ME stocks are 
riskier than low BE/ME stocks, and have higher expected returns in economic downturns. 
Another explanation implies that value premium is driven by investor sentiment (e.g. DeBondt 
and Thaler, 1987; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994; Daniel and Titman, 1997; Baker and Wurgler, 
2006). If investor sentiment is high, investors may over-price stocks with high growth options, thus 
leading to the overpricing of low BE/ME stocks. Since overpricing will eventually be corrected, the 
returns of low BE/ME stocks will decrease and result in the value premium following high investor 
sentiment.  
Gulen, Xing, and Zhang (2008) test the risk-based explanation proposed by Zhang (2005), and 
find some evidence suggesting that value premium is high following the high-volatility state. However, 
their high-volatility state does not necessarily mean a recession state, which makes it difficult to interpret 
their results given that the theory in Zhang (2005) predicts the value premium based upon the state of the 
economy. Furthermore, we find that the economic variables that they use to proxy aggregate economic 
conditions do not have a reliable association with the state of the economy, which makes it even more 
difficult to interpret their results.1  
Baker and Wurgler (2006) test the sentiment-based explanation, and find weak supporting 
evidence. For instance, in one out of eight cases, the value premium (measured by the return difference 
between medium BE/ME stocks and low BE/ME stocks) is high following high investor sentiment.   
The present paper intends to extend the value premium literature based on Gulen, Xing, and 
Zhang (2008) and Baker and Wurgler (2006). First, different from Gulen, Xing, and Zhang (2008), we 
use a more informative and parsimonious measure of the state of the economy to test the risk-based 
explanation of the value premium. Specifically, we use the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI-
MA3) to measure aggregate economic conditions. This index is originally proposed by Stock and Watson 
(1999), and is used by Boyd, Jagannathan, and Hu (2005) to identify the state of the economy. Basically, 
this index is the first principal component (the common component) of 85 macroeconomic indicators. 
Therefore, it is a more informative and parsimonious measure of overall economic activity and related 
inflationary pressure than any individual macroeconomic variable or a smaller set of macroeconomic 
variables. The national activity index is also more useful than the NBER business cycle dates data. The 
NBER’s decision of an official turning point usually comes many months after the turning point date, 
while the national activity index is released on a monthly basis and provides a better real-time measure of 
aggregate economic conditions. 
Second, different from Baker and Wurgler (2006), we focus on the value premium within big ME 
stocks and that within small ME stocks, not the overall value premium for all stocks. As Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) among others point out, small ME stocks may be more sensitive to investor sentiment 
than big ME stocks. Therefore, the mispricing due to investor sentiment and hence the value premium 
should be more evident among small ME stocks. In fact, in our sample, the value premium within big ME 
stocks is 0.28 percent per month (which is not statistically significant), while that within small ME stocks 
                                                 
1 See also García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) and Rytchkov (2010). 
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is 0.63 percent per month (which is statistically significant at one percent level). Therefore, if we do not 
differentiate between the value premium within big ME stocks and that within small ME stocks, we may 
induce noise into our estimations and subsequently reduce the power of tests.  
Third, previous empirical studies typically test these two competing explanations of the value 
premium in isolation. A preferable option is to examine these two explanations jointly. Studying these 
two potential explanations of the value premium in isolation is problematic. If only one factor is relevant 
and the other factor simply has a spurious correlation with this factor, studying these two factors in 
isolation could lead incorrectly to a conclusion that both factors are relevant. However, in a joint test, the 
factor that has no association with the value premium will lose its explanatory power as soon as the 
relevant factors are included.  
Therefore, we examine these two competing explanations of the value premium jointly in a 
regression framework in this paper. Empirically, we find that while value premium is correlated with the 
investor sentiment, it shows very little correlation with aggregate economic conditions.  Based on this 
evidence, it is very difficult to argue that value premium is due to risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses our data and 
motivation. Section 3 presents our empirical methodology and results. Section 4 concludes the paper with 
a brief summary. 
. 
2. Data and Motivation  
We use the sentiment index proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) to measure the investor 
sentiment. The index is based on six popular sentiment indicators: trading volume as measured by NYSE 
turnover; the dividend premium; the closed-end fund discount; the number and first-day returns on IPOs; 
and the equity share in new issues. The sentiment level index is the first principal component of these six 
indicators, while the sentiment changes index is the first principal component of the changes in these six 
indicators. The sentiment index is constructed to be orthogonal to a set of macroeconomic variables 
including growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption, 
growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the sentiment level 
index with the shaded areas corresponding to recession periods dated by NBER. Since the sentiment data 
from Jeffrey Wurgler’s site are only available from 1967:5 to 2007:12, we focus on the sample period 
from 1968:1 to 2007:12 in this paper.  
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI-MA3) is used as the measure of aggregate 
economic conditions. The economic indicators comprising the index are drawn from five broad categories 
of data: (1) output and income (21 series); (2) employment, unemployment and hours (24 series); (3) 
personal consumption, housing starts and sales (13 series); (4) manufacturing and trade sales (11 series); 
and (5) inventories and orders (16 series). The index is basically the first principal component of these 85 
data series. If all 85 series were proportional to a single common variable plus individual noise, the index 
would be the estimate of the common variable that minimizes the implied noise discrepancies in a least-
squares sense. The index is constructed to have an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one 
over the long run. Since economic activity tends toward trend growth rate over time, an index reading of 
zero corresponds to an economy growing at trend.2 Panel B of Figure 1 shows the activity index with the 
shaded areas corresponding to recession periods dated by NBER. It seems that the activity index tracks 
the US aggregate economic activity well.  
 
                                                 
2 For more details, please go to http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/cfnai.cfm. 
3 
 
Figure 1 Sentiment index and Chicago Fed National Activity Index 
Panel A: Sentiment Index 
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Panel B: Chicago Fed National Activity Index 
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
 
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the sentiment level index with the shaded areas corresponding to 
recession periods dated by NBER. Panel B of Figure 1 shows the activity index with the shaded 
areas corresponding to recession periods dated by NBER. 
 
Gulen, Xing, and Zhang (2008) use the one-month Treasury bill rate (TB), the default premium 
(DEF), the growth in the monetary base (∆M), and the dividend yield (DIV) as proxies of aggregate 
economic conditions. To examine the explanatory power of these variables, we estimate the following 
regression model in a similar fashion as Gulen, Xing, and Zhang (2008). 
tttttt eDIVaMaDEFaTBaaNAI ++∆+++= −−−− 142312110                                                 (1) 
where NAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index. The results for the whole sample period as well as 
for two equal sub-sample periods are reported in Table 1. The t-ratios are based on Newey-West HAC 
standard errors with the lag parameter set to 12. The significant coefficients (at the 5% level for the two-
sided test) are in bold. As we can see, none of the four variables has a reliable association with the 
national activity index. Our findings therefore suggest that the results in Gulen, Xing, and Zhang (2008) 
may not be the decisive supporting evidence of the risk-based explanation of the value premium, and it is 
important to re-test the risk-based explanation with the national activity index (a more informative 
measure of aggregate economic conditions).  
Our stock returns data are from Kenneth French’s website. In Table 2, we report the value 
premium over the whole sample period as well as over the two equal sub-sample periods. As we can see, 
the value premium within big ME stocks is usually much smaller than that within small ME stocks and is 
often not statistically significant. For instance, for the whole sample period, the value premium within big 
ME stocks is 0.28 percent per month (which is not statistically significant), while that within small ME 
stocks is 0.63 percent per month (which is statistically significant at one percent level). Therefore, if we 
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do not differentiate between the value premium within big ME stocks and that within small ME stocks (as 
in Baker and Wurgler, 2006), we may induce noise into our estimations and reduce the power of tests. 
 
Table 1 Explanatory power tests 
 
 Constant TB DEF ∆M DIV R2 
   1968-2007    
Coef. 0.43 -0.51 -0.74 5.88 0.76 0.16 
T-stat 1.29 -1.08 -3.69 1.64 0.83  
   1968-1987    
Coef. 0.93 -0.30 -0.50 22.24 -3.35 0.35 
T-stat 0.91 -0.43 -1.87 2.24 -1.81  
   1988-2007    
Coef. 0.97 -0.70 -0.99 0.75 0.43 0.17 
T-stat 1.73 -1.93 -2.66 0.33 0.47  
We estimate the following regression model: 
tttttt eDIVaMaDEFaTBaaNAI ++∆+++= −−−− 142312110                                     
where NAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index, TB is the one-month Treasury bill rate, DEF is the default 
premium, ∆M is the growth in the monetary base, and DIV is the dividend yield. The results for the whole sample 
period as well as for the two equal sub-sample periods are reported in Table 1. The t-ratios are based on Newey-
West HAC standard errors with the lag parameter set to 12. The significant coefficients (at the 5% level for the two-
sided test) are in bold. 
 
Table 2 Value premium 
 
Big ME  H - L H – M M - L 
LH
MH
−
− (%) 
LH
LM
−
−  (%) 
1968-2007 Mean 0.27 0.13 0.14 48 52 
 t-stat 1.59 1.52 0.98   
1968-1987  0.42 0.24 0.18 57 43 
  2.03 2.02 1.07   
1988-2007  0.12 0.02 0.10 17 83 
  0.45 0.19 0.42   
Small ME  H - L H – M M - L 
LH
MH
−
− (%) 
LH
LM
−
−  (%) 
1968-2007 Mean 0.62 0.15 0.47 24 76 
 t-stat 3.25 2.34 3.18   
1968-1987  0.62 0.22 0.40 35 65 
  2.56 2.50 2.23   
1988-2007  0.62 0.09 0.54 15 87 
  2.11 0.92 2.30   
In Table 2, we report the value premium over the whole sample period as well as over the two equal sub-sample 
periods. 
 
Previous empirical studies usually test the two competing explanations of the value premium in 
isolation. We argue that testing these two explanations in isolation may be problematic. If only one factor 
is relevant and the other factor simply has a spurious correlation with this factor, testing these two factors 
in isolation could incorrectly suggest that both factors are relevant. However, in a joint test, the factor that 
has no association with the value premium will lose its explanatory power as soon as the relevant factors 
are included. Therefore, in this paper, we examine these two competing explanations of the value 
premium jointly. 
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3. Empirical Methodology and Results 
The two competing explanations of the value premium offer distinct predictions. The risk-based 
explanation of Zhang (2005) predicts that: (1) it is high BE/ME stocks that drive the value premium, since 
they become more risky in economic downturns; (2) since value stocks become more risky with 
worsening economic conditions, their returns should be positively correlated with the change in economic 
conditions (i.e. their returns decrease with worsen economic conditions); (3) since higher risk means 
higher expected returns, the returns of high BE/ME stocks should be high following economic downturns. 
In other words, there should be a negative correlation between the returns of high BE/ME stocks and the 
prior aggregate economic conditions. 
Alternatively, the sentiment-based explanation predicts: (1) it is low BE/ME stocks that drive the 
value premium, since they are over-priced when investor sentiment is high; (2) since growth stocks are 
over-priced when investor sentiment is high, their returns should be positively correlated with the change 
in investor sentiment; (3) since overpricing will eventually be corrected, the returns of low BE/ME stocks 
should be low following high investor sentiment. Put differently, there should be a negative association 
between the returns of low BE/ME stocks and the prior investor sentiment. We next test these three sets 
of predictions in a joint fashion. 
 
3.1 Testing the first set of predictions 
We test the first set of their predictions by simply decomposing the value premium into two 
components: the return difference between high BE/ME stocks and medium BE/ME stocks and the return 
difference between medium BE/ME stocks and low BE/ME stocks. As we can see from Table 2, the value 
premium is more due to the return difference between medium BE/ME stocks and low BE/ME stocks. For 
instance, for small ME stocks, the return difference between medium BE/ME and low BE/ME stocks is 
76%, 65% and 87% of the value premium for the whole sample period as well as for the two sub-sample 
periods, respectively. Therefore, the evidence seems to suggest that the sentiment-based explanation may 
be more important. 
 
3.2 Testing the second set of the predictions 
To test the second set of predictions, we run the following regressions.  
tttt SENNAIHML εββα +∆+∆+= 12111                                                                         (2a) 
tttt SENNAIHMM εββα +∆+∆+= 22212                                                                       (2b) 
tttt SENNAIMML εββα +∆+∆+= 32313                                                                        (2c) 
where HML represents the return difference between high BE/ME and low BE/ME stocks, HMM is the 
return difference between high BE/ME and medium BE/ME stocks, MML is the return difference 
between medium BE/ME and low BE/ME stocks, tNAI∆ is the change in the national activity index 
which is a proxy of the change in aggregate economic conditions, and tSEN∆ is the sentiment change 
index which measures the change in investor sentiment. 
Eq. (2b) and Eq. (2c) are useful for testing the two competing explanations of the value premium. 
The risk-based explanation implies that since value stocks become more risky with worsening economic 
conditions, their returns should be positively correlated with the change in economic conditions. 
Therefore, β21 should be positive if value premium is due to risk. On the other hand, the sentiment-based 
explanation predicts that since growth stocks are over-priced when investor sentiment is high, their 
returns should be positively correlated with the change in investor sentiment. Therefore, β32 should be 
negative if the value premium is indeed due to investor sentiment (note that MML is the return of medium 
BE/ME stocks minus the return of low BE/ME stocks). 
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Table 3 Contemporaneous regressions 
 
1968-2007 Constant ∆NAIt ∆SENt R
2 
   Big ME   
HM L Coef. 0.26 -0.17 -0.46 0.02 
 T-stat 1.56 -0.29 -1.27  
HMM  0.13 -0.19 0.02 0.00 
  1.52 -0.45 0.19  
MML  0.13 0.01 -0.48 0.03 
  0.90 0.03 -1.60  
   Small ME   
HM L  0.58 -0.47 -1.18 0.11 
  3.44 -0.77 -3.58  
HMM  0.15 -0.15 -0.13 0.01 
  2.31 -0.73 -1.60  
MML  0.44 -0.32 -1.05 0.14 
  3.46 -0.66 -3.65  
1968-1987 Constant ∆NAIt ∆SENt R
2 
   Big ME   
HM L Coef. 0.43 -0.58 0.36 0.01 
 T-stat 2.06 -0.89 1.33  
HMM  0.24 -0.31 0.16 0.00 
  1.99 -0.65 1.06  
MML  0.19 -0.27 0.20 0.00 
  1.11 -0.59 0.70  
   Small ME   
HM L  0.61 -1.13 -0.41 0.03 
  2.69 -1.73 -1.55  
HMM  0.22 -0.31 -0.01 0.00 
  2.56 -1.40 -0.05  
MML  0.39 -0.83 -0.40 0.04 
  2.35 -1.54 -2.08  
1988-2007 Constant ∆NAIt ∆SENt R
2 
   Big ME   
HM L Coef. 0.09 0.59 -1.16 0.13 
 T-stat 0.36 0.59 -2.64  
HMM  0.02 0.14 -0.10 0.00 
  0.17 0.23 -0.76  
MML  0.07 0.45 -1.06 0.16 
  0.32 0.54 -3.06  
   Small ME   
HM L  0.57 1.33 -1.83 0.24 
  2.32 1.34 -4.63  
HMM  0.08 0.33 -0.23 0.03 
  0.89 0.84 -2.33  
MML  0.49 1.00 -1.60 0.27 
  2.64 1.34 -4.40  
To test the second set of predictions, we run the following regressions.  
tttt SENNAIHML εββα +∆+∆+= 12111                                                             
tttt SENNAIHMM εββα +∆+∆+= 22212                                                          
tttt SENNAIMML εββα +∆+∆+= 32313                                                            
where HML represents the return difference between high BE/ME and low BE/ME stocks, HMM is the return difference between 
high BE/ME and medium BE/ME stocks, MML is the return difference between medium BE/ME and low BE/ME stocks, 
tNAI∆ is the change in the national activity index which is a proxy of the change in aggregate economic conditions, and 
tSEN∆ is the sentiment change index which measures the change in investor sentiment. The results for the whole sample period 
as well as for the two sub-sample periods are reported in Table 3. The t-ratios are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors 
with the lag parameter set to 12. The significant coefficients (at the 5% level for the two-sided test) are in bold. 
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Table 4 Predictive regressions 
 
1968-2007 Constant NAIt-1 SENt-1 R2 
   Big ME   
CHM L Coef. 2.98 3.71 0.69 -0.03 
 T-stat 1.43 1.91 0.34  
CHMM  1.45 1.83 -0.27 -0.02 
  1.49 1.10 -0.41  
CMML  1.53 1.88 0.96 -0.04 
  0.83 0.95 0.48  
   Small ME   
CHM L  6.85 6.41 5.86 0.10 
  3.08 2.31 2.75  
CHMM  1.67 2.23 0.65 0.01 
  2.18 2.37 1.07  
CMML  5.18 4.18 5.21 0.13 
  3.14 1.98 2.87  
1968-1987 Constant NAIt-1 SENt-1 R2 
   Big ME   
CHM L Coef. 4.59 4.00 -0.92 0.00 
 T-stat 1.94 2.12 -0.85  
CHMM  2.77 0.67 0.10 -0.11 
  2.26 0.44 0.15  
CMML  1.82 3.33 -1.03 -0.01 
  0.88 1.41 -0.91  
   Small ME   
CHM L  6.14 9.65 3.79 0.21 
  2.34 3.83 3.88  
CHMM  2.27 2.85 0.38 0.05 
  2.47 3.79 0.78  
CMML  3.87 6.80 3.42 0.26 
  2.08 3.46 4.48  
1988-2007 Constant NAIt-1 SENt-1 R2 
   Big ME   
CHM L Coef. 1.19 1.79 7.80 -0.02 
 T-stat 0.39 0.26 1.17  
CHMM  0.29 4.05 -2.37 0.01 
  0.22 1.36 -1.31  
CMML  0.90 -2.26 10.17 0.14 
  0.39 -0.37 1.87  
   Small ME   
CHM L  7.06 -1.95 15.98 0.22 
  2.34 -0.35 3.24  
CHMM  1.00 0.12 1.94 -0.06 
  0.88 0.05 1.26  
CMML  6.06 -2.06 14.04 0.30 
  2.79 -0.47 3.44  
To test the third set of predictions, we run the following regressions. 
tttt SENNAICHML εββα +++= −− 1121111                                                          
tttt SENNAICHMM εββα +++= −− 1221212                                                       
tttt SENNAICMML εββα +++= −− 1321313                                                           
where CHML represents the cumulative return of HML from January through December of year t, CHMM is the cumulative 
return of HMM, CMML is the cumulative return of CMML, 1−tNAI is the national activity index that prevailed at the end of the 
prior year, and 1−tSEN represents the sentiment index that prevailed at the end of the prior year. The results for the whole sample 
period as well as for the two sub-sample periods are reported in Table 3. The t-ratios are based on Newey-West HAC standard 
errors with the lag parameter set to 12. The significant coefficients (at the 5% level for the two-sided test) are in bold. 
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The results for the whole sample period as well as for the two sub-sample periods are reported in 
Table 3. The t-ratios are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors with the lag parameter set to 12. The 
significant coefficients (at the 5% level for the two-sided test) are in bold. We focus on the results for 
small ME stocks because Table 2 shows that value premium is more a small ME stock phenomenon. As 
we can see, none of the β21 coefficients is significant, while all β32 coefficients are significantly negative 
at the one percent level. Therefore, the evidence further suggests that the value premium may be more due 
to investor sentiment. 
 
3.3 Testing the third set of the predictions 
To test the third set of predictions, we run the following regressions. 
tttt SENNAICHML εββα +++= −− 1121111                                                                       (3a) 
tttt SENNAICHMM εββα +++= −− 1221212                                                                     (3b) 
tttt SENNAICMML εββα +++= −− 1321313                                                                      (3c) 
where CHML represents the cumulative return of HML from January through December of year t, 
CHMM is the cumulative return of HMM, CMML is the cumulative return of CMML, 1−tNAI is the 
national activity index that prevailed at the end of the prior year, and 1−tSEN represents the sentiment 
index that prevailed at the end of the prior year. 
Eq. (3b) and Eq. (3c) are especially useful for testing the two competing explanations of value 
premium. The risk-based explanation predicts that since higher risk means higher expected returns, the 
returns of high BE/ME stocks should be high following economic downturns. Therefore, β21 should be 
negative if the value premium is driven by risk. In contrast, the sentiment-based explanation predicts that 
since overpricing will eventually be corrected, the returns of low BE/ME stocks should be low following 
high investor sentiment. Therefore, β32 should be positive if the value premium is driven by investor 
sentiment (note again that MML is the return of medium BE/ME stocks minus the return of low BE/ME 
stocks). 
The results for the whole sample period as well as for the two sub-sample periods are reported in 
Table 3. The t-ratios are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors with the lag parameter set to 1. The 
significant coefficients (at the 5% level for the two-sided test) are in bold. Again, we focus on the results 
for small ME stocks because the value premium is mainly a small ME stock phenomenon. As we can see, 
none of the β21 coefficients is significantly negative, while all β32 coefficients are significantly positive at 
the one percent level. Therefore, again, the evidence confirms that the value premium is mainly due to 
investor sentiment. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The present paper intends to extend the value premium literature based on Gulen, Xing, and 
Zhang (2008) and Baker and Wurgler (2006). Specifically, we add to the literature by using a more 
informative and parsimonious measure of aggregate economic conditions, focusing on small ME stocks, 
and testing the competing explanations of value premium in a joint fashion. We find that while value 
premium is correlated with investor sentiment, it shows very little correlation with the state of the 
economy. Based on this evidence, it is very difficult to argue that value premium is due to risk. 
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